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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and 
Equality (“Korematsu Center”), Hispanic National 
Bar Association (“HNBA”), National Asian Pacific 
Americans Bar Association (“NAPABA”), National 
Bar Association (“NBA”), National LGBT Bar 
Association (“LGBT Bar”), and National Native 
American Bar Association (“NNABA”), respectfully 
submit this brief in support of the petitioner, 
Michelle Lee. 
The Korematsu Center is a nonprofit organization 
based at Seattle University School of Law and works 
to advance justice through research, advocacy, and 
education.  The Korematsu Center is dedicated to 
advancing the legacy of Fred Korematsu who defied 
military orders during World War II that led to the 
internment of 110,000 Japanese Americans, and 
later became an advocate for the civil rights of other 
victims of excessive government action.  The 
Korematsu Center has a strong interest in ensuring 
that our courts, laws and government do not become 
active participants in perpetuating discrimination.  
The Korematsu Center does not, in this brief or 
otherwise, represent the official views of Seattle 
University. 
HNBA comprises thousands of Latino lawyers, 
law professors, law students, legal professionals, 
                                                 
1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no 
counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the 
preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than the amici 
curiae or their counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or 
submission.  Letters evidencing the parties’ blanket consent to the filing 
of amicus briefs have been filed with the clerk. 
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state and federal judges, legislators, and bar 
affiliates across the country.  The HNBA supports 
Hispanic legal professionals and is committed to 
advocacy on issues of importance to the 53 million 
people of Hispanic heritage living in the United 
States.  The HNBA regularly petitions Congress and 
the Executive on behalf of all members of the 
communities it represents. 
NAPABA is the national association of Asian 
Pacific American attorneys, judges, law professors, 
and law students.  NAPABA represents the interests 
of over 50,000 attorneys and approximately 75 
national, state, and local bar associations.  Its 
members include solo practitioners, large firm 
lawyers, corporate counsel, legal service and non-
profit attorneys, and lawyers serving at all levels of 
government.  Since NAPABA’s inception in 1988, it 
has promoted justice, equity, and opportunity for 
Asian Pacific Americans as the national voice for 
Asian Pacific Americans in the legal profession. 
These efforts have included civil rights advocacy on 
various fronts.  In furtherance of its mission to 
promote justice, equity, and opportunity for Asian 
Pacific Americans, NAPABA seeks to ensure that the 
government does not become a partner in advancing 
harmful racial slurs. 
NBA is the nation’s oldest and largest national 
network of predominantly African-American 
attorneys and judges in the United States.  The NBA 
was founded in 1925 when there were only 1,000 
African-American attorneys in the entire country 
and when other national bar associations, such as 
the American Bar Association, did not admit African-
 3  
 
 
American attorneys.  Throughout history, the NBA 
consistently has advocated on behalf of African 
Americans and other minority populations.  The 
NBA represents approximately 66,000 lawyers, 
judges, law professors, and law students, and it has 
over eighty affiliate chapters throughout the world. 
LGBT Bar is a non-partisan, membership-based 
professional association of lawyers, judges, legal 
academics, law students, and affiliated lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgender legal organizations. The 
LGBT Bar promotes justice in and through the legal 
profession for the LGBT community in all its 
diversity.  This case stands to impact our 
membership both professionally and personally.  Our 
members are of all different races, ethnicities, and 
religious affiliations.  We see this intersectionality of 
our members every day, and fear a detrimental 
impact should the respondent be successful in this 
case. 
NNABA is the oldest and largest association of 
predominantly Native American attorneys in the 
United States.  Founded in 1973 when the first group 
of Native American attorneys was entering the legal 
profession, NNABA represents the interests of 
approximately 2,700 Native American attorneys.  
NNABA’s core mission since its inception has been to 
promote the development of Native American 
attorneys who share the communal responsibility of 
advancing justice for Native Americans.  NNABA 
seeks to ensure that the government does not become 
a partner in advancing harmful racial slurs. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Amici know all too well what it means to be 
excluded from full participation in society. When this 
exclusion is committed by a private individual or 
entity, we can explain to our children that these are 
actions by private actors and we can even see if there 
is recourse to federal, state, and local laws that 
might provide some relief.  But when the government 
itself participates in the exclusion by conferring 
benefits to private actors, we are at a loss as to what 
to tell our children.  Private acts and expressions of 
racism can be terrible and damaging, but they take 
on a wholly different meaning and are particularly 
corrosive to our ideal of an integrated society when 
they occur with the sanction of government. 
Simon Tam would have this Court believe that 
this case is about political speech—that his re-
appropriation project is about “taking on/back” a 
derogatory term that has been used to demean those 
of Asian American descent.  But that is not what this 
case is about.  This case is about a trademark.  To 
put a more fine point on it: this case is about the 
registration of a trademark. 
Trademarks, by their very nature, propose a 
commercial transaction that identifies the source of 
goods or services being offered.  It is precisely 
because of their commercial nature that Congress 
has authority to regulate the trademark registration 
system.  In doing so, Congress seeks to both protect 
consumers and to ensure the orderly flow of 
commerce.  But marks that disparage do not further 
either of these goals.  In fact, they do the opposite by 
discouraging consumers from full market 
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participation.  As this Court well remembers, racial 
discrimination has a depressing effect on the 
economy.  Thus, while the REDSKINS may be a 
professed homage to the noble savage for some, it is a 
painful reminder for Native Americans of their place 
in American society.  The Slants is no better.  While 
empowering to a young social justice rock band, that 
same mark may be debilitating for those who 
remember life in American internment camps during 
World War II.  At its core, Section 2(a) does not 
operate as a ban on certain types of speech, but 
rather a mechanism for dealing with the harmful 
effects of racial, national origin, and religious 
discrimination on interstate commerce. 
There can be no doubt that even without 
registration, Simon Tam can still use his mark and 
his music to “take on” stereotypes about Asian 
Americans.  But what he cannot do is use the 
government’s resources to prevent others from fully 
participating in the American marketplace.  
Reversing the decision below would prevent the 
trademark registration program from transforming 
what is clearly commercial speech into something 
more.  But it surely will not prevent Mr. Tam from 
continuing his re-appropriation project. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Congress and this Court have recognized 
that racial discrimination threatens the 
government’s substantial interest in 
ensuring the orderly flow of commerce. 
Not too long ago—in fact, within the lifetime of 
our country’s President—businesses were allowed to 
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freely express racially discriminatory commercial 
messages.  Signs like “WHITE ONLY” affixed outside a 
business’s entrance were not uncommon.  In the 
Southwest, before entering a business one might 
read a sign that read “NO DOGS NEGROS MEXICANS.”  
In other parts of the country, some businesses 
discriminated against Native Americans (“NO BEER 
SOLD TO INDIANS”), and others targeted Filipinos 
(“POSITIVELY NO FILIPINOS ALLOWED”). 
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The deleterious effects of racism on commerce and 
individual dignity have been undisputed for the past 
half-century.  Laws banning discrimination in public 
accommodations, such as Title II of the Civil Rights 
 8  
 
 
Act of 1964 2 and Washington state’s Law Against 
Discrimination, 3  were enacted  “to vindicate ‘the 
deprivation of personal dignity that surely 
accompanies denials of equal access to public 
establishments.’” 4   These laws were enacted to 
ensure that state power to regulate commerce was 
used to combat the effects of racial discrimination, 
not profit from them. 
Title II’s legislative history reveals that 
Congress’s primary intent in enacting the law was to 
address the deleterious effects of racism on 
commerce and personal dignity. 5   As this Court 
explained in upholding Title II, the congressional 
record is “replete with testimony of the burdens 
placed on interstate commerce by racial 
discrimination.”  Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294, 299 (1964).  The Court also cited “many 
references” to racial discrimination causing “a 
depressant effect on general business conditions in 
the respective communities,” noting that this 
discrimination “deterred professional, as well as 
skilled, people from moving into areas where such 
practices occurred and thereby caused industry to be 
                                                 
2 42 U.S.C. 2000a. 
3 Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60. 
4  Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 
(1964) (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 16-17 (1964), reprinted in 1964 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2370); Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.010 (recognizing 
that race and sexual orientation discrimination “threatens not only the 
rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but menaces the institutions 
and foundation of a free democratic state”). 
5 S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 16-17 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2355, 2370. 
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reluctant to establish there.” Id. at 300.  The Court 
thus found “ample basis” to conclude that commerce 
was adversely “obstructed” “because of [racial] 
discrimination.”  Id. 
As Martin Luther King, Jr. explained in his Letter 
from a Birmingham Jail, racism in commerce inflicts 
a devastating toll on people of color, who have to 
explain to their children why they are being treated 
differently: 
[Y]ou suddenly find your tongue twisted 
and your speech stammering as you 
seek to explain to your six-year old 
daughter why she cannot go to the 
public amusement park that has just 
been advertised on television, and see 
tears welling up in her eyes when she is 
told that Funtown is closed to colored 
children, and see the depressing clouds 
of inferiority begin to form in her little 
mental sky . . . .6 
The corrosive impacts of racial discrimination are not 
limited to conduct in the public accommodations 
context.  Discriminatory speech in commerce can 
have similar impacts.  That is why, for example, 
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits 
advertisements that communicate a discriminatory 
preference.  See 42 U.S.C. 3604(c) (unlawful to 
“make, print, or publish . . . any notice, statement, or 
advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a 
dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or 
                                                 
6 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail 6-7 (Apr. 16, 
1963), reprinted in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 76 (1964).   
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discrimination based on race, color, religion, [or] 
sex”).  And Title VII places similar restrictions on job 
advertisements.  See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(b) (unlawful 
“to print or publish . . . any notice or advertisement 
relating to employment . . . indicating any 
preference, limitation, specification, or 
discrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin”). 
Back in the 1960s, in a not-so-distant echo of the 
arguments being raised in this case, defenders of 
racial discrimination challenged state and federal 
laws banning discrimination in commerce under the 
First Amendment.  But none of those challenges 
succeeded, and by 1964 “the constitutionality of such 
state statutes [stood] unquestioned.”7 
Dissenting in the opinion in this case below, Judge 
Reyna poses the hypothetical of a restaurant named 
“Spics Not Welcome.”  If the restaurant nevertheless 
served Latinos, it presumably would not be in 
violation of Title II.  Yet he notes that “[t]he mere 
use of the demeaning mark in commerce 
communicates a discriminatory intent as harmful as 
the fruit produced by discriminatory conduct.”  In re 
Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Reyna, J., 
dissenting), cert. granted sub nom., Lee v. Tam, No. 
15-1293, 2016 WL 1587871 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2016).  
Judge Reyna is right. 
Unfortunately, these examples are not 
anachronisms or implausible hypotheticals.  
Recently, gun shops in several states have placed 
                                                 
7 Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 259-60 & n.8 (listing states); see also In 
re Johnson, 71 Wash. 2d 245 (1967) (rejecting constitutional challenges 
to Washington’s statute). 
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signs on their stores that proclaim that the stores are 
“Muslim Free Zone[s].”  
 
The owner of one of the stores, Florida Gun 
Supply, states, “My goal is to make sure they don’t 
feel welcome here so I don’t have the need to 
discriminate in the first place.” 8  In this way, the 
owner is able, through commercial speech, to 
accomplish that which he could not do through direct 
denial of service.9 
The businesses that put up these signs accomplish 
exactly what they set out to do: they erect, through 
commercial speech, a discriminatory wall that shuts 
                                                 
8 Fight over Florida gun store’s ‘Muslim free zone’ is far from over, 
WJHL.COM (Dec. 5, 2015), http://wjhl.com/2015/12/05/fight-over-florida-
gun-stores-muslim-free-zone-is-far-from-over/. 
9 In a similar fashion, an Indiana legislator conceded that Indiana’s 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act would permit businesses to put up 
signs that say “No Gays Allowed.” Adalia Woodbury, Indiana Lawmaker 
Admits “No Gays” Signs Will Be Allowed, POLITICUSUSA (Mar. 30, 
2015), http://www.politicususa.com/2015/03/30/connecticut-state-
boycottindianas-rfra.html. 
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off commerce to a class of individuals on the basis of 
their race, national origin, or religion.  In other 
words, they accomplish through commercial speech 
precisely what the Civil Rights Act was designed to 
root out.   
The elders in amici’s respective organizations are 
all too familiar with confronting signs that marked 
certain parts of the marketplace as being off limits to 
them and their children.  Amici have worked too 
hard to fight for and win the right to fully participate 
and enjoy the fruits of a desegregated marketplace.   
But under the theory espoused by the decision 
below, blatantly discriminatory signs could not be 
denied federal registration under the Lanham Act.  
In fact, if the decision below stands, “Spics Not 
Welcome” could become a federally protected 
trademark.  And if that happens, the Latino father—
like the black father described in Dr. King’s letter—
would have to explain to his daughter, “tongue 
twisted and [his] speech stammering,” why these 
signs are not only allowed in modern-day America, 
but also coated with the legitimacy of a federally 
approved trademark. 
B. Section 2(a) advances the government’s 
substantial interest in ensuring the 
orderly flow of commerce. 
“The intent of [the Lanham Act] is to regulate 
commerce[.]”  15 U.S.C. 1127.  Trademarks are “a 
form of commercial speech and nothing more.”  
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979).  
Trademarks are used to “propos[e] a commercial 
transaction” by identifying the source of goods or 
 13  
 
 
services.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980).   
Because trademarks are commercial speech, the 
government can deny or cancel registration if doing 
so advances a substantial government interest, such 
as the orderly flow of commerce.  See id. at 564.  By 
that standard, Section 2(a) easily passes 
constitutional muster because it is a content neutral 
regulation that promotes the orderly flow of 
commerce. 
1. Section 2(a) is a content neutral regulation 
of commercial speech. 
i.  The government can regulate trademarks to 
promote the orderly flow of commerce because “the 
Constitution accords less protection to commercial 
speech than to other constitutionally safeguarded 
forms of expression.”  Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. 
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983).  That is why the 
government can ban deceptive trademarks.  
Friedman, 440 U.S. at 13.  And it is precisely 
because trademarks are commercial speech and the 
government has a substantial interest in “insuring 
that the stream of commercial information flow[s] 
cleanly as well as freely,” Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976), that the government can 
set up a federal trademark registry in the first place.   
At its core, a trademark restricts other 
commercial speech by ensuring that certain speakers 
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have a limited monopoly over the use of a particular 
message.  That is the essence of a trademark.10 
ii.  But the same interest that gives rise to the 
government’s power to register trademarks—the 
orderly flow of commerce—also allows the 
government to regulate trademarks.  And that is 
why Section 2(a) is content neutral.  The “principal 
inquiry” for determining whether a law is content 
neutral is “whether the government has adopted a 
regulation of speech because of disagreement with 
the message it conveys.”  Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). In other words, in 
determining whether a law is content neutral, “[t]he 
government’s purpose is the controlling 
consideration.” Id. (emphasis added).  See also 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011) 
(Ward test applies to commercial speech). 
In Ward, the Court upheld restrictions on sound 
amplification at an outdoor bandshell, because the 
“[t]he principal justification for the sound-
amplification guideline is the city’s desire to control 
noise levels at bandshell events, in order to retain 
the character of the [adjacent] Sheep Meadow and its 
more sedate activities.”  491 U.S. at 791.  The Court 
made clear that a regulation that “serves purposes 
unrelated to the content of expression is deemed 
                                                 
10 The decision below erroneously conflates commercial and political 
speech, reasoning that if a trademark has any relation to a political 
message, it must be afforded full First Amendment protections.  But that 
simply creates a giant loophole to the rule that commercial speech is 
treated differently, and would open the door to companies adopting quasi-
political messages to avoid the regulations (e.g., against deceptive 
advertising) that would normally apply only to commercial speech. 
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neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some 
speakers or messages but not others.”  Id. at 791-92. 
Ward built off the Court’s decision in City of 
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).  
The regulation at issue in Renton explicitly treated 
“adult” movie theaters differently from other 
theaters, and defined “adult” theaters solely by 
reference to the content of their movies.  Id. at 44.  
Nevertheless, the Court treated the zoning 
regulation as content neutral because the ordinance 
was aimed at the secondary effects of adult theaters, 
a justification unrelated to the content of the adult 
movies themselves.  Id. at 48.  See also City of Erie v. 
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000) (concluding that 
a regulation is “still properly evaluated as a content-
neutral restriction” if the government’s “interest” is 
in “combating the secondary effects . . . unrelated to 
the suppression of the [message]”); Osborne v. Ohio, 
495 U.S. 103, (1990) (regulating private speech 
associated with child pornography given the 
secondary effects of the speech).  Taken together, 
even if a regulation implicates content, that 
regulation is still subject to intermediate scrutiny so 
long as the government’s purpose is to address the 
secondary effects of the speech.   
Here, the government’s purpose under 
Section 2(a) is not to suppress speech, but to ensure 
the orderly flow of commerce.  See 15 U.S.C. 1127 
(“The intent of this chapter is to regulate 
commerce[.]”).  Racially discriminatory commercial 
speech disrupts the orderly flow of commerce to a 
substantial degree.  The purpose of Section 2(a) is to 
ward off those secondary effects, an interest which is 
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unrelated to the suppression of any speech.  That is 
why Congress passed—and this Court has repeatedly 
upheld—laws like the Civil Rights Act. 
Thus, under Section 2(a), the government’s 
concern is not whether it approves of the message 
conveyed by a particular mark, but whether a 
particular mark disrupts commerce by, for example, 
inciting racial hatred or inflicting dignitary harm.  In 
effect, Section 2(a) is a rather quotidian time, place, 
and manner restriction, similar to laws regulating 
adult businesses,11 or laws regulating speech because 
of its secondary effect on commerce.12 
In addition to prohibiting registration of marks 
which may disparage institutions or groups, 
Section 2(a) also prohibits registration of marks that 
are likely to cause confusion among consumers, 
implicate their privacy interests, or are otherwise 
misleading or deceptive—all things likely to harm 
consumers or impact their ability and desire to 
participate fully in commerce.  See 15 U.S.C. 1052. 
Just like marks that confuse or mislead 
consumers, or marks that invade consumer privacy, 
marks that disparage individual or group identities 
have the effect of decreasing full consumer 
participation in commerce while also sending the 
message that the government is a participant in 
endorsing, advancing, and promoting that behavior.  
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (upholding ban on fully 
nude dancing). 
12  See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 647 
(1994) (affirming F.C.C.’s must-carry regulations because they furthered 
the substantial government interest in “protecting noncable households 
from loss of regular television broadcasting service” (citation omitted)). 
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Section 2(a) alleviates these harms and directly 
advances the government’s interests in distancing 
itself from racial discrimination thereby discouraging 
the perpetuation of racial discrimination in 
commerce and encouraging full participation by all 
consumers in commerce.13  A number of commercial 
speech cases have recognized substantial interests 
that are unavoidably entangled with government 
disapproval of a certain message. 14   Here, Section 
2(a)’s primary purpose of ensuring the orderly flow of 
commerce also coincides with the government’s 
substantial interest in discouraging racial, social, 
and religious discord.15 
                                                 
13 See Sambo’s Rests., Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 695 (6th 
Cir. 1981) (noting that “racial harmony and equality is a substantial state 
interest”). 
14 See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto 
Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) (discouraging gambling); Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 466-67 (1978) (regulating in-person 
attorney solicitation). 
15 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (recognizing 
that “help[ing] to ensure the basic human rights of members of groups 
that have historically been subjected to discrimination, including the right 
of such group members to live in peace where they wish” is a compelling 
state interest); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 396 
(1978) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“In light of the sorry history of 
discrimination and its devastating impact on the lives of Negroes, 
bringing the Negro into the mainstream of American life should be a state 
interest of the highest order.”); Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263, 
277 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A]lthough a state government might practice racial 
discrimination for decades—and many have—we would not therefore be 
barred from considering racial equality a state interest of the highest 
order.” (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 396)); Sambo’s Rests., Inc., 663 F.2d at 
695. 
 18  
 
 
Because the government’s interest is not to 
suppress speech but to promote the orderly flow of 
commerce, Section 2(a) is content neutral. 
iii. The importance of this interest is perhaps best 
evidenced by the policies implemented by the U.S. 
Board of Geographic Names.16  Dead Negro Draw, 
Texas, ostensibly honors black soldiers who died 
during a battle, except that until the U.S. Board of 
Geographic Names intervened, it was called Dead 
Nigger Creek on federal maps. 17   Over 30 place 
names in America were originally called 
“Niggerhead” on federal maps, but most of those 
names were changed to swap out “Nigger” for Negro, 
such as Negro Ben Peak, Arizona—“named after a 
miner known as ‘Nigger Ben McClendon.’”18   
As late as 1974, there were 200 place names on 
federal maps that still referenced “Japs,” and even 
today there are 30 places on federal maps named 
“Chinaman.”19  And until last year, a lake and creek 
in Washington were called Coon Lake and Coon 
Creek, respectively, on federal maps.   
                                                 
16  Donald J. Orth & Roger L. Payne, Principles, Policies, and 
Procedures: Domestic Geographic Names, U.S. BD. OF GEOGRAPHIC 
NAMES 21-22 (1997), http://geonames.usgs.gov/docs/pro_pol_pro.pdf. 
As discussed above, Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is another 
strong example of the government disavowing harmful racial 
discrimination in commerce. 
17 Jennings Brown, Tal Reznik, & Matan Gilat, Racial Slurs Are Woven 
Deep Into The American Landscape, VOCATIV (Oct. 29, 2015), 
http://www.vocativ.com/news/244179/racial-slurs-are-woven-deep-into-
the-american-landscape/. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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It goes without saying that a black family would 
be reticent to visit a place called Niggerhead.  Just 
like a Japanese mother is unlikely to take her son to 
a park called Jap Point.  And those feelings were 
made all the worse because until relatively recently 
the federal government approved those names and 
published them on its maps.  
This shows that when the government creates 
programs like the federal trademark registry or 
publishes maps, it may decline to allow others to use 
the programs in a manner that contributes to 
discrimination.  Of course, individuals are free to call 
these locations whatever they want—just like they 
are free to use whatever trademark they want—but 
the government is under no obligation to help spread 
hatred, given the effects it has on commerce. 
2. Being denied federal registration has not 
prevented Tam from continuing to use a 
racial slur for his band’s name. 
Amici are all too familiar with the sting of slurs 
such as “slant,” “chink,” “gook,” “sand nigger,” and 
the like.  These taunts are not limited to the 
schoolyard.  Racial slurs and epithets often 
accompany racialized violence.  In 1982, a white 
Detroit autoworker called Vincent Chin a “Chink” 
and “Nip” before beating Chin to death with a 
baseball bat.  In 1992, Luyen Phan Nguyen was 
killed in Coral Springs, Florida, by a group of white 
men who followed Nguyen from a party after Nguyen 
objected to the use of a racial slur.  In 2001, Balbir 
Singh Sodhi was killed in Mesa, Arizona, by a 
gunman who had been overheard previously at a bar 
saying he wanted to kill “ragheads.” 
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Simon Tam has used a racial slur as his band’s 
name since 2006.  This usage has created a 
protectable trademark and he could enforce his 
common law rights in federal court.  This usage 
persisted even after his application for federal 
registration was denied in 2013.  The denial of 
registration has not prevented him from continuing 
his proclaimed project to re-appropriate or reclaim 
this racial slur. 20   There is no extraneous 
consequence to a mark owner who uses a trademark 
that the federal government refuses to register.  
Mr. Tam can still call his band The Slants, and still 
register any other trademarks he wishes (so long as 
those trademarks independently qualify).  In fact, 
Mr. Tam could still use the Lanham Act’s other 
provisions to enforce his trademarks, registered or 
not.21   
Put differently, engaging in speech that the 
government refuses to register as a trademark does 
not disqualify Mr. Tam from using the Lanham Act 
to register and enforce other trademarks, or even to 
enforce unregistered ones (like The Slants).22  It is 
                                                 
20Reclamation projects sometimes fail spectacularly. Commenting on 
comedian Trevor Noah’s failed attempt to reclaim the slur “kaffir,” 
Kagiso Lediga said, “It was well spirited, and it came from a good place, 
trying to make it into a good word. But leave it alone.”  Norimitsu Onishi, 
Jail Time for Using South Africa’s Worst Racial Slur?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/world/africa/south-
africa-hate-speech.html?_r=0. 
21 See 15 U.S.C. 1125(a). 
22 See, e.g., Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Indus., L.P., 616 
F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that cancellation of registration 
“does not affect the mark’s validity, because a trademark need not be 
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simply a narrow limitation on Mr. Tam’s ability to 
force the government to publish this one mark in the 
federal register.  
3. The cancellation of the REDSKINS 
trademark registration illustrates the 
importance of Section 2(a). 
Race still matters in this country.  For many, that 
is not an easy concept to accept, given how far 
removed we are from the Trail of Tears, slavery, and 
Jim Crow.  But the vestiges of racism are all around 
us.  This case is just one example.   
There are others, too.  One of the most visible 
examples of a racist trademark is the one used by the 
WASHINGTON REDSKINS football team.  For decades 
this team has called itself by a racial slur, and until 
recently that slur had a federal seal of approval in 
the form of a registered trademark.  But recently, the 
government decided to cancel the registration of 
several of the team’s trademarks, finally recognizing 
what so many already knew: that the term redskin is 
a racial slur, and should never have been allowed 
into the federal registry.  The issue is currently 
before the Fourth Circuit.  As applied to the 
particular trademarks at issue in the two cases, the 
question there is the same as the one presented here: 
whether the government can, consistent with the 
First Amendment, refuse to register a racially 
disparaging trademark.  Here, however, the court 
below imposed the far more sweeping remedy of 
                                                                                                    
registered to be enforceable”); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. 
Wheeler, 814 F.2d 812, 819 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[T]he cancellation of a 
trademark registration does not extinguish common law rights that 
registration did not create.”). 
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facial invalidation of a federal statute.  Applying 
such “strong medicine,” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 
U.S. 601, 613, the en banc Federal Circuit essentially 
held that no trademark—no matter how offensive or 
denigrating to racial groups, can be refused the 
benefits that accompany federal registration.   
The REDSKINS example informs how the Court 
should approach this case.  Even if the Court were to 
decide that Section 2(a) is unconstitutional as 
applied to Mr. Tam, it should not find Section 2(a) 
unconstitutional on its face.  The REDSKINS 
trademark is perhaps the foremost example of the 
impact that a racially disparaging trademark has on 
commerce.  The mark is known worldwide, and its 
use pervades every corner of our society.  As the 
REDSKINS case shows, this provision stands as an 
important bulwark against a flood of racially 
discriminatory marks that would severely and 
negatively affect commerce, particularly for people of 
color.   
Amici use the REDSKINS example in this brief to 
show the Court that the government can, consistent 
with First Amendment principles, cancel or refuse to 
register a racially disparaging trademark given the 
substantial interest in an orderly flow of commerce.  
The REDSKINS case exemplifies the magnitude of 
impact that disparaging marks can have on 
commerce, and it shows why we still need Section 
2(a). 
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i.  For centuries Native Americans 23  have been 
arguably the most marginalized group in the United 
States.  While the efforts of other racial groups to 
overcome their respective marginalization are far 
from over, in some ways the Native American 
community is still just beginning.  Among major 
ethnic and racial groups in America, Native 
Americans rank at or near the bottom in income per 
capita, high school graduation rates, and political 
representation, and suffer from the highest poverty 
and unemployment rates.  The child born in America 
with the lowest probability of ever achieving self-
determination is the Native American child.  And 
unfortunately that statement has been true for a 
very long time.   
It is against this historical backdrop of 
marginalization that a $2.85 billion professional 
sports team has proudly used a racial slur against 
Native Americans as its team name.  The word 
“redskins” was around long before Pro-Football, Inc. 
(“PFI” or the “Team”) adopted it as its name, logo, 
and mascot.  But it has always been clear that the 
term has been used to dehumanize a group of human 
beings living in America.   
Like calling African Americans “niggers” and 
Latinos “spics”—words that long ago fell out of favor 
in common lexicon precisely because of their negative 
effects on those groups—Native Americans have 
suffered the indignity of being called “redskins” by 
                                                 
23 Amici use the term Native Americans throughout this brief to refer 
interchangeably and collectively to American Indian, Alaska Native, and 
Native Hawaiian peoples. 
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those who would diminish their humanity. 24   The 
main difference, however, is that Native Americans 
continue to suffer this indignity in the common 
lexicon.  PFI would never call itself the “Washington 
Spics,” and then have the audacity to argue that 
doing so is okay because there is no proof that a 
“substantial composite” of Latinos find that term 
offensive.  Nor would the National Football League 
(“NFL”) permit such a name—it penalizes use of 
racially derogatory language on the field as 
unsportsmanlike conduct.25 
ii.  The term “‘redskin’ was first used as a 
reference to American Indian people at a time when 
[they] were hunted for bounty and a price was paid 
for a red skin.”26  It is “to Indian people what ‘nigger’ 
is to African Americans.”27 
                                                 
24 Amici recognize the odious, abhorrent, and offensive nature of these 
racist slurs, even when they appear in a legal brief that describes their 
harm and repudiates them.  Nevertheless, amici use the slurs themselves, 
rather than their abbreviations, not to be incendiary or exploitative, but to 
demonstrate a point: as a society, we are far more uncomfortable with 
certain slurs, such as those that discriminate against African Americans 
and Latinos, whereas the slur against Native Americans is almost 
quotidian. 
25 Roger Goodell, 2016 Official Playing Rules of the National Football 
League, NFL 54-55 (2016), http://operations.nfl.com/ media/2224/2016-
nfl-rulebook.pdf; see also Jonathan Jones, Foul Language: The NFL is 
cracking down on the use of the N-word on the football field, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 26, 2016), http://www.si.com/nfl/2016/10/26/nfl-n-
word-penalty-unsportsmanlike-conduct (describing the NFL’s recent 
history of imposing 15-yard penalties on players who use the n-word). 
26  Note, A Public Accommodations Challenge to the Use of Indian 
Team Names and Mascots in Professional Sports, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
904, 912 n.64 (1999) (quoting Letter from Lawrence R. Baca, Chairman, 
Indian Law Section of the Federal Bar Association, to John Hope 
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It is unlikely that when the Team adopted the 
name “redskins” in 1932 that it was doing so as an 
homage to Native Americans, and far more likely 
that it reflected racial animus.  In fact, the next year 
the Team’s owner, “George Preston Marshall 
instituted what would become a 13-year league-wide 
ban on African-American players from the NFL.”28  
And, as the rest of the NFL integrated in response to 
the Civil Rights Movement, the Team remained the 
last holdout, clinging to segregation until the bitter 
end.   
It took 30 years—until 1962—for the Team to 
integrate and finally accept its first non-white 
players, the last NFL team to do so.  But not because 
the Team suddenly changed its mind about racial 
discrimination: “[i]n contrast to other N.F.L. owners, 
[Team owner] Marshall ‘did not pretend there were 
no blacks good enough to make his team,’. . . ‘he was 
honest enough to admit that he simply didn’t want 
them around.’”29   
                                                                                                    
Franklin, Chairman, President’s Advisory Board on Race Relations 2 
(June 30, 1997) (on file with Harvard Law School Library)) 
(HEREINAFTER “Indian Team Names”). 
27 Id. at 912 n.65 (quoting Lawrence R. Baca, What About the Indian 
Country “N” Word? 2 (Nov. 17, 1998) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with Harvard Law School Library)). 
28  Ending the Legacy of Racism in Sports & the Era of Harmful 
“Indian” Sports Mascots, NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS 2 (Oct. 2013), 
http://www.ncai.org/attachments/PolicyPaper_ 
mijApMoUWDbjqFtjAYzQWlqLdrwZvsYfakBwTHpMATcOroYolpN_
NCAI_Harmful_Mascots_Report_Ending_the_Legacy_of_Racism_10_2
013.pdf. 
29 Ryan Basen, Fifty Years Ago, Last Outpost of Segregation in N.F.L. 
Fell, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2012), 
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In fact, and particularly relevant here, the reason 
the Team desegregated and began signing non-white 
players was because “[t]he Redskins were preparing 
to move into a new stadium being built on federally 
controlled land affiliated with the national parks 
system,” and the government stipulated that the 
Team had to integrate to use the new stadium.30  In 
other words, for the sole purpose of taking advantage 
of a discretionary federal benefit, did the Team 
finally integrate.  And even then, only begrudgingly 
as the Team’s owner lamented that “the government 
had the right to tell a showman how to cast the 
play.”31 
Half a century later, the Team’s decision to cling 
to its racist name is consistent with its 
discriminatory past.  But this time, the Team wants 
to bootstrap its racist name to another discretionary 
federal program: the trademark registry. 
iii.  The government’s decision to decline to 
register racist slurs makes sense for all the same 
reasons that the government regulates 
discrimination in public accommodations and 
geographic place names—because the harms of 
disparagement in commerce are real.  “Indian team 
names and mascots in particular have been charged 
with fostering ‘racial stereotyping,’ causing low self-
esteem amongst American Indians, and setting up 
                                                                                                    
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/sports/football/50-years-ago-
redskins-were-last-nfl-team-to-integrate.html. 
30 Id.   
31 Id.   
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Indian children as targets for physical harassment 
by their peers.”32  And that’s not all: 
The studies suggest that American 
Indian mascots have harmful 
psychological consequences for the 
group that is caricaturized by 
mascots.  This is true whether . . . the 
mascot represented an American Indian 
university, a mainstream university, or 
a professional sports team.  
. . . . 
American Indian mascots thus remind 
American Indians of the limited ways in 
which others see them.  Moreover, 
because identity construction is not 
solely an individual process (i.e., you 
cannot be a self by yourself), the views 
of American Indians held by others can 
also limit the ways in which American 
Indians see themselves.33 
The bombardment of slurs has a lasting negative 
effect on Native Americans, not only “threaten[ing] 
the psychological functioning of American Indians” 
but also “facilitating the expression of discriminatory 
and explicitly racist attitudes toward American 
                                                 
32 Indian Team Names, supra n.26, at 911 (footnotes omitted). 
33  Stephanie A. Fryberg, et al., Of Warrior Chiefs and Indian 
Princesses: The Psychological Consequences of American Indian 
Mascots, 30 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 208, 216 (2008).  
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Indians” by non-Native people. 34   As Professor 
Steinfeldt explained to Congress: 
Having a cultural icon like Chris 
Berman provide colorful commentary on 
Washington’s pro football team doesn’t 
mean that such a hateful racial 
[epithet] (i.e., Redskin) doesn’t hurt 
people—rather, it means that the people 
using this hateful term have become 
desensitized to the fact that they are 
hurting people with their historical 
tradition of dishonor.  Despite how 
members of mainstream society want to 
frame the issue, this is NOT an issue of 
mere sensitivity, offensiveness, or 
“political correctness.”  Rather this is an 
issue involving oppression, 
stereotyping, and inflicting 
psychological harm[.]35 
Indeed, the human costs of racism that Dr. King 
described are not limited to those contexts where an 
accommodation is denied.  If a hotel clerk 
begrudgingly accepts African-American and Native 
American patrons, but calls each one a “nigger” and 
                                                 
34 Stolen Identities: The Impact of Racist Stereotypes on Indigenous 
People: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indians Affairs 112th Cong. 69 
(2011) (prepared statement of Jesse A. Steinfeldt, Assistant Professor, 
Indiana University-Bloomington). 
35  Id.; see also APA Resolution Recommending the Immediate 
Retirement of American Indian Mascots, Symbols, Images, and 
Personalities by Schools, Colleges, Universities, Athletic Teams, and 
Organizations, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N (2005), 
http://www.apa.org/about/policy/mascots.pdf (citing many studies finding 
psychological harm of exposure to negative stereotypes). 
 29  
 
 
a “redskin,” those harms are not cut off at the front 
desk; a father is still left with the unenviable task of 
explaining to his daughter, “tongue twisted and [his] 
speech stammering,” why a business is permitted to 
register those terms and why they are still accepted 
as normal parlance in 2016. 36   Likewise, if hotels 
(and sports teams) admit minorities, but use names 
like “Redskins Inn,” “Nigger Inn,” or “Spic Inn”—and 
even get such names federally registered as 
trademarks—the impact is similar to a denial of 
public accommodations.  
iv.  Given this history, the government finally 
canceled the registration of several of the Team’s 
trademarks, correctly finding that they are racist 
and contrary to the government’s interest in 
promoting orderly and non-discriminatory commerce.  
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 
461 (E.D. Va. 2015).   
Canceling registration of the REDSKINS trademark 
did not restrict PFI’s speech.  The Team can still sell 
hats, jerseys, and footballs bearing its racist name.  
Cancellation simply means the government will not 
affirmatively allow its own program to be used to 
endorse, promote, or subsidize PFI’s ability to 
capitalize on its mark.  This Court has repeatedly 
held that the government can decline to subsidize 
                                                 
36 See Jones v. City of Boston, 738 F. Supp. 604, 605 (D. Mass. 1990) 
(noting that calling patron a “nigger” at a bar—despite serving him—still 
satisfies the Title II requirement “of showing that he was denied equal 
access to a place of public accommodation on the basis of race” because 
“[t]he term ‘nigger’ is intimidating by its very nature”). 
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certain speech. 37   That is especially true in the 
commercial context where the government has a 
substantial interest in promoting a non-
discriminatory flow of commerce. 
But the decision below creates a world where 
“Spics Not Welcome” and “Muslim Free Zone” could 
be registered as federal trademarks, and the 
WASHINGTON REDSKINS could remain a federally 
registered trademark.  And so, should the decision 
below stand, the Native American father must still 
explain to his daughter why it remains acceptable for 
others to think nothing of calling their people 
“redskins” on SportsCenter, and why the federal 
government has approved and endorsed the use of its 
® next to a slur and done nothing to distance itself 
from such racial discrimination. 
We have come too far to take such a big step back. 
CONCLUSION 
Refusing federal registration of Simon Tam’s 
disparaging mark may not eliminate the derogatory 
term from the American lexicon.  Indeed, it will not 
deter Simon Tam from using the term for his re-
                                                 
37 See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 
546 (1983) (“We again reject the notion that First Amendment rights are 
somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State.” 
(citation and quotation marks omitted)); Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 
555 U.S. 353, 359 (2009) (“[T]he State’s decision not to [provide 
deductions for union dues] is not an abridgment of the unions’ speech; 
they are still free to engage in such speech as they see fit.  They simply 
are barred from enlisting the State in support of that endeavor.”); Lyng v. 
UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 366 (1988) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to 
law barring certain workers who are on strike from receiving food 
stamps). 
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appropriation project.  But these facts should not 
prevent the government from refusing to use its 
resources for activity that deters rather than 
promotes commerce.  Amici respectfully request that 
the Court reverse the decision below. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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